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This paper uses a political settlement lens to argue 
that the United Nations Transitional Administration 
in East Timor (UNTAET), which administered 
the territory from October 1999 through to its 
independence on 20 May 2002, largely fulfilled the 
elements of the security and governance mandate 
conferred on it by the United Nations Security 
Council but that this was not sufficient to create 
the conditions for lasting stability in East Timor.1 
UNTAET succeeded in supporting the political and 
structural separation of the territory from Indonesia, 
in the process putting in place many of the elements 
of the machinery for the new state. However, it did 
not pay sufficient heed to the consequences of its 
decisions for the internal political settlement that 
was taking shape across Timor’s elites and the wider 
society. In order to examine the evolving political 
settlement over the life of UNTAET, this paper looks 
at three areas: the political space that opened up 
under UNTAET; the organisation of the transitional 
government; and the making of the Constitution for 
the future state of Timor-Leste.
On 30 August 1999, the people of East Timor 
were given the opportunity to vote for independ-
ence2 after 24 years of Indonesian occupation. The 
outcome was a convincing 78.5 per cent in favour. 
The announcement of the results signalled the 
beginning of a systematic and vicious campaign of 
orchestrated violence by pro-Indonesian militias, 
with the Indonesian state seemingly powerless to 
protect its citizens in the face of the onslaught. In 
the space of a few weeks some 250,000 people — 
almost one-third of the population — were herded 
across the border into West Timor, and towns-
people were stripped of their possessions and their 
houses torched. Around 70 per cent of public infra-
structure across the entire territory was destroyed: 
public buildings and government records were 
burnt and communications, water supply and elec-
tricity infrastructure were comprehensively trashed.
The complicity of the Indonesian security forces 
in these events was described in unusually frank 
terms by an official UN mission sent to Timor in 
early September:
The involvement of large elements of the 
Indonesian military and police in East 
Timor in organizing and backing the unac-
ceptably violent actions of the militias has 
become clear to any objective observer and 
was acknowledged publicly by the Minister 
of Defence on 11 September (United Nations 
Security Council 1999b: para. 19).
The response of the international community 
was swift and resolute. On 15 September, the UN 
Security Council authorised the immediate deploy-
ment of a multinational force to restore peace and 
security in East Timor and facilitate humanitar-
ian assistance pending the establishment of a UN 
peacekeeping operation (UNSC Resolution 1264, 
15 September 1999). Six weeks later, the Security 
Council mandated the successor UN peacekeeping 
mission to stabilise and administer the territory of 
East Timor through to independence (UNSC  
Resolution 1272, 25 October 1999). The mission 
was named the UN Transitional Administration in 
East Timor (UNTAET).
UNTAET was hailed as an outstanding success  
at the time of Timor’s independence in May 2002: a 
welcome reprieve for the reputation of UN peace- 
keeping after a succession of lacklustre or failed 
missions. The mission could cite an impressive 
catalogue of achievements on humanitarian and 
security fronts:
• security had been restored across the territory 
and the militias effectively contained
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• more than 200,000 of those displaced across 
the border had returned from West Timor and 
been successfully reintegrated
• the former guerrilla force, Falintil, had been 
demobilised
• national security forces — both police and 
military — had been built from scratch
• a broad-based transitional justice process was 
underway
• the bilateral relationship with Indonesia had 
been placed on a sound footing and border 
management significantly normalised.
The mission could also claim that it had 
accomplished an unparalleled process of state-
building, creating the political structures and 
machinery of government literally from the ashes:
• comprehensive voter registration was 
completed
• peaceful elections were conducted for the 
Constituent Assembly charged with developing 
a constitution for the new state and, eight 
months later, for the president
• the national civil service was organised and 
largely recruited
• the physical infrastructure of government 
administration and service delivery was 
rehabilitated
• the basic structures of public finances and 
national economic management were up and 
running
• a public broadcaster was established and 
the nationwide infrastructure for radio 
transmission restored.3
In the euphoria of independence day, few if 
any in the international community foresaw the 
violence that would erupt in 2006, when the deep 
hostility between competing elite interests and 
between the country’s two senior political lead-
ers was played out in the streets of the capital and 
regional towns and elements of the security forces 
morphed into partisan enforcers for sectional polit-
ical interests. Government buildings and a large 
number of homes were torched, around 150,000 
people — 15 per cent of the population — were 
displaced and some 30 people were killed.
What went wrong in Timor-Leste? The answer 
would seem to lie, in part, in the character of the 
political settlement that took shape during the 
transitional period of UNTAET administration of 
the territory. The concept of ‘political settlement’ 
has gained wide currency in the past few years in 
the policy literature on state-building in fragile 
and conflict-affected states as the understanding 
grew that state-building is a deeply political pro-
cess (OECD 2011:11) and that efforts to build the 
machinery of the state to a rational-bureaucratic 
template that ignores context are doomed to fail.
Although usage of the term is still far from 
settled, a political settlement can be broadly 
understood as:
… the expression of a common understand-
ing, usually forged among elites, about how 
political power is to be organised and exer-
cised, and about how the nature of the  
relationship between state and society is to  
be articulated (Rocha Menocal 2009:8).
In the policy literature, peace-building efforts 
are directed towards the development of a positive 
political settlement — one that is inclusive and stable 
— and the political settlement in turn is the founda-
tion upon which the state is built.
What bearing does this have on an assessment 
of UNTAET’s work and impact? Arguably, UNTAET 
built the wrong peace. Its focus was on the 
proximate causes of the conflict in East Timor: 
the contested divorce from Indonesia and the 
immediate aftermath; namely, the protection and 
return of one-third of Timor’s population displaced 
across what had become an international border 
and held in thrall by the militias, the containment 
of hostile militia incursions from the Indonesian 
side of the border and the punishment of those 
responsible for the violence of 1999. This was where 
its mandate directed it.4
UNTAET did not engage closely with the deep-
er political history of Timor and the corrosive 
relationship between prominent elite personalities 
and their supporters that was a legacy of the 24  
years of armed struggle and political resistance 
to Indonesian rule.5 As a consequence, a positive 
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political settlement was not forged within East 
Timor during the life of UNTAET and the 
institutions it nurtured deepened the fissures 
between sections of Timorese elites and between 
elite interests and the wider society.
To begin to understand why the political set-
tlement evolved as it did, some clues can be found 
in the way that the UNTAET mandate took shape 
and, importantly, the standing of the Timorese 
resistance leadership in the process. The mandate 
had its roots in the political agreement signed on 
5 May 1999 between Portugal, Indonesia and the 
UN which set out the ground rules for the pro-
posed ‘popular consultation’ that would give the 
people of East Timor their chance to vote on inde-
pendence. The standing of the three signatories was 
anchored in history. At the time of the Indonesian 
invasion of Timor in 1975, Portugal held Timor 
as a non-self-governing territory. It had commit-
ted to rapid decolonisation the previous year, and 
within weeks several political parties had emerged 
in Timor. Their positions on the political transition 
were sharply divergent, and in August 1975 one of 
the two major parties (UDT) attempted to seize 
power by force; its rival (Fretilin) counterattacked 
and the Portuguese administration withdrew in 
disarray from the territory. By early September  
Fretilin emerged as the victor and on 28 November 
1975 it declared independence.
Indonesia, purportedly acting at the behest 
of the parties that had been vanquished by 
Fretilin, invaded on 7 December 1975. Portugal 
immediately took Timor’s case to the UN Security 
Council, and continued thereafter to argue Timor’s 
claims for self-determination in annual debates 
on the ‘question of Timor’ in the UN General 
Assembly. In 1982 the General Assembly requested 
the Secretary-General to initiate consultations 
with all parties directly concerned with a view 
to achieving a comprehensive settlement. The 
Secretary-General interpreted this narrowly to 
mean only Portugal and Indonesia, to the exclusion 
of the resistance movement leadership (CAVR 
2005:111), setting in train a pattern of tripartite 
engagement that was maintained through to the 
agreement that was signed on 5 May 1999.6
The terms of the agreement are instructive. 
Article 6 specifies that, should the people of East 
Timor reject the proposal for special autonomy (i.e. 
vote for independence), then:
… the Governments of Indonesia and Por-
tugal and the Secretary-General shall agree 
on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly 
transfer of authority in East Timor to the 
United Nations (United Nations Security 
Council 1999a: Annex 1, emphasis added).
To give effect to the transfer of authority to the 
United Nations, Portugal and Indonesia had first 
to withdraw their sovereign claims. In line with the 
terms of the 5 May agreement, the Indonesian legis-
lature passed a law on 19 October 1999 repealing its 
1976 law annexing East Timor (Crouch 2000:167). 
The next day Portugal advised the United Nations 
that it would relinquish its legal ties to East Timor 
and consider UNTAET to be its successor upon the 
adoption of the Security Council resolution man-
dating the mission (Chopra 2000:937).
Five days later, the Security Council resolved to 
establish the mission. Operative paragraph 1 of the 
resolution determined that UNTAET:
… will be endowed with overall responsibility 
for the administration of East Timor and 
will be empowered to exercise all legislative 
and executive authority, including the 
administration of justice (United Nations 
Security Council 1999d).
The mandate was one of extraordinary breadth: 
the powers vested in the mission, to be exercised 
through the person of the UN Transitional Admin-
istrator, included all the classical powers of a state, 
albeit exercised as a trustee rather than as a sover-
eign (Stahn 2001:109, 115).
The Timorese themselves were largely absent 
from the mandate. Although the Security Council 
resolution does reference them, their role is a  
passive one of responding to the ‘the need for 
UNTAET to consult and cooperate closely with the 
East Timorese people’. No express provision was 
made to include the Timorese in executive decision-
making or in the administration of those decisions. 
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The implicit message of the Security Council was 
that the Timorese resistance movement should 
keep a low profile in the governing structures of the 
transitional state in deference to Indonesian sensi-
bilities (Suhrke 2001:5).
As well as exercising quasi-sovereign powers, 
UNTAET was different from all previous peace-
keeping missions in one other fundamental respect. 
In all other contexts, the parties to the conflict 
remained inside the territorial borders of the state 
in which the mission was deployed, forcing the 
resolution of a political settlement to centre stage. 
In Timor, however, the perpetrators of the violence 
had withdrawn across what had become an inter-
national border and were most unlikely to return 
in numbers that would destabilise the state. Those 
left within the territorial borders shared a common 
political goal of moving rapidly towards the crea-
tion of an independent nation.
This benign situation induced two fundamental 
misunderstandings on the part of UNTAET. First, 
it mistook the absence of government as a politi-
cal vacuum, and paid insufficient attention to the 
complex political dynamic playing out around it. 
Second, it mistook the shared goal of independence 
as signifying a broader consensus about the institu-
tional design of the new state.
These misunderstandings allowed UNTAET 
to press ahead with building the machinery of 
government as an essentially technical exercise 
without reflecting on the profound institutional 
consequences of the policy choices being made 
and which local interests they inadvertently 
favoured. And there was little time for reflection 
given the accelerated countdown to independence 
demanded by both the Timorese leadership and 
the Security Council, albeit for different reasons. 
The pressure was on to deliver the benchmarks 
set out in the strategic plan for the transition to 
independence, which marked out the steps to build 
up a civil service, a defence force, a police force, a 
constitution, a body of core legislation and political 
machinery.7 It was the outputs that counted, rather 
than the thoroughness of consultation and analysis 
that produced them. Yet the process and the 
outcomes had considerable bearing on the political 
settlement in East Timor over this period.
To understand how the decisions taken by 
UNTAET inadvertently shaped the character of the 
political settlement that emerged, it is instructive to 
look at developments in three domains:
• the political space that opened up under UNTAET
• the organisation of government
• the making of the Constitution.
The Increasingly Contested Political Space
On its face, the Timorese resistance movement 
was speaking with one voice in the lead-up to the 
popular consultation in 1999. It was coordinated 
under the umbrella of the Concelho Nacional de 
Resistencia Timorense (CNRT), a body established in 
1998 that brought together all major East Timorese 
political parties, the Catholic Church and civil 
society organisations to guide the political transition 
to independence. However, CNRT’s overarching 
message of national unity and cooperation 
masked deep fault lines within the political elite. 
Surprisingly perhaps, the party divisions of 1974–75 
had faded, despite the events leading up to the 
Indonesian invasion. The divisions among those 
who had fought and struggled on the same side for 
independence over the long years of occupation 
were much deeper, fuelled by ideology and 
grievance, parallel histories and tactical positioning 
to snatch the prizes of victory.
The bitter fruits of occupation that divided 
former comrades-in-arms in the armed resistance 
struggle have been comprehensively documented 
elsewhere (CAVR 2005; International Crisis 
Group 2006). Significantly, several of the leaders 
who were purged at various stages emerged as 
influential political spoilers during the UNTAET 
period. Other divisions opened up as the post-
conflict political settlement began to take shape: 
the returning diaspora — wealthy, educated and 
fluent in the languages of the new political order 
— were deeply resented by those who had suffered 
through a quarter century of occupation and now 
found themselves marginalised economically and 
professionally; and young Timorese, whose activism 
had carried the resistance struggle through the 
decade of the nineties, were resentful of the older 
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generation of leaders and its impositions. But these 
divisions were yet to become apparent as UNTAET 
was designed and deployed.
In the lead-up to the popular consultation the 
UN, through its Department of Political Affairs 
(DPA), engaged with CNRT as the voice of the 
independence struggle and the CNRT flag was 
adopted as the symbol for the independence option 
on the ballot paper for the popular consultation. 
DPA and World Bank staff had considered ways 
of involving the Timorese in the management of 
the transition, and plans were made for a national 
consultative commission that would serve as a 
quasi-legislative body and as a framework for 
participation (Suhrke 2001:8). CNRT expectations 
were no less:
On the basis of the legitimacy that came 
from the 30 August referendum, the CNRT 
expected to be consulted at every level and to 
participate actively in the transition period 
(Ramos Horta 1999b).
Just days before the UNTAET mandate was 
resolved, CNRT elected a Transition Council to 
serve as the ‘principal dialogue partner’ with UNTAET 
(Walsh 1999). In the event, it was to be sorely 
disappointed. The politics of the new mission and a 
switch in responsibility at UN headquarters from the 
DPA to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
saw CNRT eclipsed,8 and it ‘… was not accepted 
by the United Nations as the primary legitimate 
Timorese body when the Transitional Administration 
was established’ (Roland and Cliffe 2002:2).
Instead, UNTAET engaged narrowly with 
Timorese elites along the independence/autonomy 
axis that steered the popular consultation. This was 
reflected in the composition of the National  
Consultative Council (NCC), which was consti-
tuted in early December 1999, only weeks after the 
mission was mobilised, as ‘the primary mechanism 
through which the representatives of East Timor 
shall actively participate in the decision-making 
process of UNTAET’ (UNTAET Regulation No. 
1999/2, section 1). Its membership included seven 
representatives of CNRT and three representatives 
of groups outside CNRT, these numbers purport-
ing to broadly reflect the proportionate outcome 
of the popular consultation (UNTAET Regula-
tion No. 1999/2, section 2). A representative of the 
Catholic Church, the UN Transitional Administra-
tor and a further three members of UNTAET made 
up the remainder of the council. All members were 
appointed by the Transitional Administrator.
Under pressure from civil society, UNTAET 
gradually expanded the breadth and authority of its  
consultative machinery. In April 2000, in response 
to complaints that the NCC was a secretive body,  
UNTAET opened proceedings to invited observers 
from non-government organisations and the  
guerrilla organisation Falintil. Three months later,  
in July 2000, a Regulation was made to replace the  
NCC with a more broadly based — but still 
appointed — National Council. The expanded 
membership of 33 Timorese accommodated a  
spectrum of civil society and sectoral representation 
— women, youth, the Protestant churches, the 
Muslim community, the NGO Forum, professional  
associations, the farming community, the business 
community, labour organisations and the 13 districts 
— as well as the 10 CNRT and political party 
members and the Catholic Church representative 
included in the NCC membership. Importantly, it 
was an all-Timorese body, empowered ‘to act as a  
forum for all legislative matters related to the  
legislative authority of the Transitional Administrator’ 
(UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/24), although the 
Transitional Administrator retained power of veto.
On the same day, a further Regulation (UNTAET 
Regulation No. 2000/23) was promulgated estab-
lishing a Cabinet for executive decision-making. 
Eight Cabinet portfolios were created, of which 
four were assigned to Timorese. These covered the 
soft social and economic development functions. 
Police, political affairs, justice and finance portfolios 
were held by international personnel, and the 
Transitional Administrator chaired the Cabinet. 
Controversially, three of the four Timorese Cabinet 
posts went to members of the diaspora; these three 
were also leading figures in Fretilin and UDT, the 
two dominant political parties which the following 
month would pull out of CNRT, leaving it with 
little voice in the Cabinet.
The crunch came at the national congress of 
CNRT held in August 2000, which brought into 
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the open the differences between the leadership of 
CNRT and its main component party, Fretilin, and 
to a lesser extent with UDT (United Nations Securi-
ty Council 2001a: para. 6). Neither party joined the 
CNRT Permanent Council, reducing it to a rump of 
newer and smaller parties. Their withdrawal weak-
ened CNRT politically and undermined its claim to 
primacy as the voice of the people and the natural 
interlocutor with UNTAET.9
Fretilin’s withdrawal from CNRT freed it to 
campaign politically at the village level, stealing the 
march on its political opponents. Meanwhile, CNRT 
was left clinging to the principles it had spelt out in 
the Pact of National Unity approved at the August 
national congress, which focused on political cohe-
sion and coalition. The pact enjoined parties to:
Undertake to work to guarantee stability, 
promoting National Unity and the politics of 
tolerance and the involvement of the diverse 
sectors of society systematically producing 
wide consensus and Platforms of Unity …
Xanana Gusmao, as President of CNRT, railed 
bitterly against the political mobilisation underway 
in an open letter to the people of East Timor on 
5 December 2000:
… some political groups have already begun 
to confuse the people by starting to register 
the population, others compel them to 
sign up for membership and threaten them 
with retaliation by FALINTIL … other 
groups fly flags everywhere while at the 
same time spreading the winds of conflict 
amidst the population. Violence, lies and 
the psychological and emotional abuse of 
our people is starting to occur. The existing 
political tension reminds us of the democratic 
awakening of 1974 … (Gusmao 2000).
UNTAET’s approach to CNRT during the 
transition period is seen to have contributed to its 
collapse as an umbrella organisation and thus to 
the emergence of partisan political competition in 
the period immediately following the August 2000 
national congress (Bowles and Chopra 2008:276–
77; Garrison 2005:23 citing Chopra; Guterres 
2006:188).
A year later, on 30 August 2001, the people of 
East Timor voted for a Constituent Assembly to 
develop a constitution for the emerging state. An 
additional task of the assembly would be to consid-
er and pass all necessary legislation in the lead-up 
to independence. At the same time, executive func-
tions would pass to a new and enlarged transitional 
Cabinet composed entirely of East Timorese. The 
Security Council was briefed in the lead-up to the 
election that the Cabinet, which was described as 
a ‘Cabinet of National Unity’, would be appointed 
by the UN Special Representative on 15 Septem-
ber and its composition would broadly reflect the 
outcome of the election (United Nations Security 
Council 2001b: para. 9).
Fretilin won a majority of votes in the election, 
and bargained hard over the formation of the Cabi-
net. The Transitional Administrator had appointed 
Mari Alkitiri, the Secretary-General of Fretilin, 
to assist him in determining the composition of 
the Cabinet, and finalisation of the Cabinet was 
delayed by several days while tough negotiations 
between them continued behind the scenes. The 
official announcement advised that ‘The Govern-
ment has 10 members from Fretilin, 3 members 
from the Democratic Party, and 11 independents’ 
(UNTAET 2001).
While on its face UNTAET achieved the aim of 
a pluralistic Cabinet, when the allocation of func-
tions within the Cabinet is unpacked the picture 
that emerges is one of Fretilin domination of the 
most strategically powerful positions. Six of the 
ten ministerial posts went to Fretilin, with inde-
pendents assigned the softer social policy areas of 
education and health, as well as the foreign affairs 
and finance portfolios (functions that would largely 
come into their own after independence). Tellingly, 
Fretilin vice-ministers were assigned to the latter 
two portfolios. Fretilin also held the two strategi-
cally critical positions of Secretary of State for the 
Council of Ministers (managing the flow of govern-
ment business) and Secretary of State for Natural 
and Mineral Resources (the predominant source of 
public revenue into the future). With the policy and 
executive powers of the Cabinet reinforced, Fretilin 
exercised considerable influence over the shape of 
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public policy in the final stages of the transition to 
independence.
The Organisation of Government
In the course of UNTAET’s building of the machin-
ery of state, a succession of decisions was taken that 
had the effect of shifting the distribution of power in 
subtle ways and creating winners and losers in the 
post-conflict settlement. The examples are legion: a 
few of the more far-reaching are outlined below.
The Language of Government and Law-Making
The political history of Timor created what seemed 
like an unbridgeable linguistic divide under UNTAET: 
the old generation of the resistance struggle and the 
diaspora favoured Portuguese as the expression of 
their patrimony and symbol of the resistance; the 
younger generation, who had carried the resistance 
struggle forward through the 1990s, were educated 
in Bahasa Indonesia. For many, there was no effec-
tive common language: the influential diaspora did 
not speak Bahasa; few of the youth spoke Portuguese; 
and the lingua franca — Tetun — was largely exclud-
ed from the equation.10 Whatever decision was taken 
on the official language, it would include or exclude 
particular interests: from jobs, from education, and 
from the more intangible benefits of nationhood and 
social inclusion.
Portuguese language had the edge from the 
outset. The Magna Carta agreed by CNRT at its 
founding convention in Portugal in 1998 positioned 
Portuguese as the official language and this 
position was reaffirmed repeatedly by the Timorese 
elites during the first year of UNTAET, despite 
widespread criticism.11 The CNRT congress in 
August 2000 again proclaimed Portuguese as the 
official language, although Tetun was recognised 
‘as the national language, to be developed within 
a five to ten year period as a second option as an 
official language’. This offered little comfort to those 
left out in the linguistic cold. UNTAET itself tried 
to step back from the decision on official language 
as a choice that no external actor could impose, 
irrespective of mandate (Harland 2005:8). The 
effect was an intense and divisive public debate, 
uncertainty and dysfunctionality in critical areas of 
public policy such as the language of schooling and 
the development of the judiciary, and a mounting 
sense in important sections of the community 
that the peace dividend that they had earned was 
bypassing them.
Establishing the Armed Forces
Decisions on whether there would be a standing 
armed force, its size and the method of recruitment 
were critical to the fate of the former guerrilla force, 
Falintil, which was cantoned in the iconic mountain 
township of Aileu through the first 18 months of 
the UNTAET administration, out of sight and with 
an escalating sense of grievance. Their future was 
uncertain: would they be rewarded as the heroic 
fighters of the resistance, or consigned to the ano-
nymity of subsistence agriculture back in their 
home villages? And, as their prospects narrowed, 
who of them would be favoured over the others?
In the lead-up to the independence vote, the 
resistance leadership had ‘vowed not to have a 
standing army in independent East Timor’ (Ramos 
Horta 1999a:120). This position shifted over the 
following months. In the wake of the post-ballot 
violence, the UN assessed that the prospects of 
demobilising Falintil had largely evaporated; with 
memories of the Japanese and Indonesian occupa-
tions of the territory and the threat of the militia 
stationed across the border in West Timor, all major 
political leaders agreed that a defence force would 
be required (Smith 2003:80). Around April 2000, 
CNRT President Xanana Gusmao wrote to the UN 
Secretary-General proposing the establishment of a 
defence force based on Falintil, a proposal charac-
terised by the UN as ‘sensitive and complex’ (United 
Nations 2000). In response, the UN accepted an 
offer from the United Kingdom to fund an expert 
group to identify options.
In the interim, the Falintil fighters remained 
sequestered in the cantonment, and the canton-
ment itself was left to fester. By the time the expert 
group from King’s College London arrived in July 
2000, the atmosphere in the cantonment was tense: 
conflict had broken out some weeks earlier between 
leadership elements, UN personnel had been con-
troversially evacuated, and the Falintil leadership 
was deeply hostile towards UNTAET over its per-
ceived neglect and disrespect. The Kings College 
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group reported in August, and on 12 September the 
Transitional Cabinet approved the establishment of 
the East Timor Defence Force. It was to be made 
up of two battalions: the first recruited exclusively 
from members of Falintil, and the second — to be 
recruited subsequently — open to all applicants.
This decision further divided the cohort of 
former fighters and its implementation intensified 
pre-existing rifts. The first battalion comprised only 
650 places, while Falintil numbers were officially 
set at around 1,900. Registered Falintil who 
were not recruited instead received reintegration 
assistance to move back into civilian life. The 
defence force recruits were seen as the winners; 
those receiving reintegration assistance were the 
losers; and beyond this cohort, some hundreds of 
men not even accepted onto the registration lists 
during the demobilisation were the double losers. 
The selection process was controlled by the Falintil 
High Command, which recruited in its image. The 
resulting first battalion has been characterised as 
made up of Gusmao loyalists (Rees 2004:49) and 
dominated by Timorese from the eastern districts 
(Ball 2002:180), demarcating the fault lines of the 
2006 conflict. Of the Falintil commanders and men 
who were excluded from recruitment, a sizeable 
minority had an acrimonious relationship with 
Gusmao and the Defence Force High Command 
and were politically identified, historically and 
contemporaneously, with Fretilin (Rees 2004:49).
Subnational Governance
If UNTAET was a bold attempt at state-building, 
the districts were a critical building block that was 
largely overlooked. The contemporary discourse 
on state-building places the evolution of a state’s 
relationship with society at centre stage (OECD 
2011:11). In East Timor in 2000, where some 
80 per cent of the population lived outside the 
capital in small towns and villages, UNTAET 
would be judged by its capacity to deliver basic 
services at local level, and village political 
organisation was as important to effective local 
governance as it had been under the Portuguese 
and Indonesian administrations. On both counts, 
UNTAET scored poorly.
Planning for the mission envisaged the 
appointment of district administrators to each 
district to oversee the work of governance and 
public administration and to coordinate UNTAET 
activities at district level (United Nations Security 
Council 1999c: para. 69). Beyond this broad job 
description, administrators had little guidance: 
their role was not further defined and they were 
given few tools to reach out to and support local 
populations. Although the administrator positions 
were filled quickly, staffing and resources for the 
district administrations were patchy at best in 
an environment where the districts were out of 
sight and competition from Dili-based managers 
was direct and intense. The organisational 
arrangements for the districts were poorly 
conceived and executed, and engagement with 
local populations was weak at best.
UNTAET adopted the broad administrative 
divisions of subnational governance used during 
the Indonesian administration: 13 districts, each 
with several subdistricts, with administrative 
offices at each level. Under UNTAET, however, 
the subdistrict operation was limited to a modest 
policing and minimal administrative presence and 
staff were glacially slow to deploy: a year into the 
mission, many offices were yet to open.
The Indonesian system was decentralised, 
with district offices managing and determining 
expenditure priorities for substantial development 
and administrative budgets funded both from 
central appropriations and locally sourced revenue. 
Elected district assemblies played an advisory role 
(Ranis and Stewart 1994). UNTAET arrangements 
in contrast were idiosyncratic and inherently 
centrist in an environment where the centre 
had almost no capacity or — in some instances 
— inclination to engage with the districts and 
planning occurred in a vacuum.
Under the UNTAET arrangements, officials 
responsible for basic services such as health, 
education and agriculture reported directly to 
head offices in Dili, which determined policy and 
budget allocations. The district administration 
was left to coordinate the rump of functions, 
but without a budget allocation or a planning 
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template. If something needed funding, the district 
administrator would have to go cap in hand to the 
sectoral official in Dili. Policy questions, similarly, 
would be referred through the Office of District 
Administration in Dili to the relevant proto-
department in the capital. These arrangements were 
a recipe for inaction in a post-conflict setting where 
the humanitarian engagement was winding back 
and the population was desperate for basic services.
These arrangements have left an uncomfort-
able legacy of structural and operational challenges 
that is still playing out: from basic logistic problems 
such as how to deliver a payroll to a government 
workforce scattered around the district, to high-
order policy debates about the appropriate form 
and provisions of decentralised governance.
In Timor, the village has been the point of 
intersection of government and community 
for over a century. The Portuguese colonial 
administration appointed village and hamlet chiefs 
as intermediaries for the district and subdistrict 
administrative officials. The Indonesian system 
broadly preserved this organisational structure, 
but introduced elections for village chiefs. The 
clandestine movement within the resistance 
struggle was also organised around leaders at the 
hamlet, village and subdistrict levels, creating a 
powerful tool for population mobilisation. Within 
these arrangements, the village chief was a central 
figure, at ‘the junction where clandestine powers, 
traditional political concepts, and the modern 
world collided with one another. He was still 
the crucial point of contact for the relationship 
between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’, between the 
local level and government’ (Hohe 2002:580).
UNTAET had little understanding of 
indigenous political organisation, and barely 
engaged at the village level. Under pressure to 
broaden consultation, it introduced district 
advisory councils in July 2000 to ensure the 
participation of the East Timorese people in 
the decision-making process of the transitional 
government at district level (UNTAET /NOT/2000/ 
14). Operation of the councils was haphazard, 
being contingent upon the relative commitment of 
the district administrator who chaired them, the 
popular legitimacy of those appointed, the character 
of the matters discussed and even basic logistics 
such as a common language for discussions and 
ease of access to the district capital for meetings 
(unhelpfully, UN rules forbade the carriage of 
non-UN personnel in UN vehicles and little other 
transport, public or private, had survived the 
looting and destruction of September 1999).
In May 2000, CNRT Vice-President and Nobel 
Laureate Jose Ramos Horta requested the UN Sec-
retary-General to replace all international district 
administrators with local leaders by August (Sydney 
Morning Herald, 24 May 2000). The spirit, if not the 
timetable or breadth, of this appeal got a response 
and on 26 September 2000 UNTAET announced 
the appointment of four Timorese administrators 
(later reduced to three) and six deputies. In time, 
other appointments followed. Those appointed were 
handed something of a poisoned chalice: an organi-
sationally and structurally dysfunctional system, 
and a serious misfit between the actual character of 
the system and the community’s experience of and 
expectations of government at the local level.
A legacy of UNTAET’s concentration in and on 
the capital was the emergence of Dili as a burgeon-
ing city-state geared to the international economy. 
Meanwhile the districts languished, buffeted by 
the loss of Indonesian commodity subsidies and 
bypassed by development while their young men 
drifted to Dili in search of opportunity in the cash 
economy. In the relationship between the emerging 
state and its society, the people of the districts were 
serious losers.
Resolution of Land Disputes
Timor’s turbulent history left a complex web of land 
usage and entitlements in its wake. Much of the land 
was governed by customary usage, but land in urban 
areas had been alienated under the Portuguese 
administration and brought under formal title. Many 
of the title holders had left immediately before or 
during the period of Indonesian administration and 
their land and property was occupied by others, 
but with the political transition to independence 
underway, the original owners were returning to 
reassert their rights. The Indonesian administration 
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had increased the area of alienated land with the 
expansion of towns and redistributed areas of 
customary land vacated during the conflict, so that 
competing customary claims also emerged with the 
political transition. The mass exodus of population 
following the popular consultation left much of the 
urban housing stock vacant, albeit badly damaged, 
and this was swiftly reoccupied and repaired — not  
necessarily by the original owners. In Dili and other 
urban areas much of this housing was rented to 
international personnel at highly inflated prices. 
Thus three layers of occupancy and claim — 
Portuguese, Indonesian and UN transition — were 
in competition.
The UN determined not to proceed with adju-
dicative mechanisms for the resolution of property 
disputes, believing no foreigner had the legitimacy 
to intrude into such a fundamental area (Harland 
2005:8). What efforts the UN Transitional Admin-
istration had made to tackle the land and property 
morass were brought to a halt in December 2000 
when four of the five Timorese ministers in the 
transitional government threatened to resign over 
the land and property unit’s acceptance of property 
deeds from the period of Indonesian administration, 
and its failure to consider those from the Portuguese 
colonial era (BBC 2000). The minister who spoke 
out in the media, one of the returning diaspora 
with property interests from the Portuguese period 
(International Crisis Group 2010:15), extracted con-
trol of the Land and Property Unit and suspended 
any further activity (Goldstone 2004:93).
Whatever policy — or absence of policy — 
existed, it was bound to favour one set of interests 
over others, where land usage is one of the most 
fiercely contested areas contributing to the out-
break and recurrence of conflict (United Nations 
2010: para. 44).12
The Making of the Constitution
Constitutions encapsulate many of the formal 
elements of the political settlement at the time of 
their making, laying down the rules governing 
the distribution and exercise of power and the 
oversight of its use. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
political transitions are often marked by the over-
haul of the national constitution or — in the case 
of a completely new state such as Timor-Leste — 
by the creation of a constitution for the first time.
Although the development of a constitution 
was not expressly listed in the UNTAET mandate, 
the report to the Security Council on which 
the mandate was based did specify that one of 
the functions of the mission would be ‘to assist 
the East Timorese in the development of a 
constitution’ (United Nations Security Council 
1999c:7), and UNTAET proceeded on the 
basis that the adoption of a constitution was a 
prerequisite for the transition to independence. 
In the words of the head of UNTAET’s Office 
of Political Affairs, ‘To effectuate the transition, 
UNTAET had to decide how to write East Timor’s 
constitution, when and how to hold elections, 
and what positions should be elective’ (Galbraith 
2003:211). In essence, the drafting of the 
Constitution was a technical hurdle to be jumped 
in order to form a government with legitimacy in 
the eyes of the international community, to in turn 
allow for the transfer of power from the UN to the 
sovereign state of Timor-Leste.
In East Timor, the process adopted to 
develop the Constitution and some of its most 
important substantive provisions had the effect of 
marginalising key elite interests and contributed 
to the build-up of disaffection and frustration 
that played out over ensuing years. UNTAET, 
in consultation with the National Consultative 
Council and its successor, the National Council, led 
the process and some of the decisions that it took 
had far-reaching consequences. Significant among 
these were:
• the form of the body that would draft the 
Constitution
• the mechanism for determining the composi-
tion of the Constituent Assembly
• the timetable for developing the Constitution
• the provision for the Constituent Assembly to 
morph into the legislature at independence
• UNTAET’s hands-off approach to the substance 
of the Constitution.
These are discussed further below.
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The Process of Constitution-Making
Constitutional Commission or Constituent 
Assembly
Initially, two mechanisms were on the table 
for the development of the Constitution: an 
appointed Constitutional Commission or an 
elected Constituent Assembly. Proponents of the 
former point to the legitimacy that comes from 
wide popular consultation, the technical expertise 
and level of reflection involved and the elevation 
of the process above politics. Proponents of the 
latter point to the legitimacy that comes through 
the ballot box and, less expressly, to the advantage 
of speed. There was evidently some divergence of 
view at senior levels of UNTAET and the wider 
UN apparatus about the merits of the two models, 
but by late 2000 the position had firmed in support 
of a Constituent Assembly (Morrow and White 
2002:34–35; Aucoin and Brandt 2010:251–54).
CNRT also shifted ground over this period. Its 
congress in August 2000 reflected that ‘the people 
of East Timor want to have a good and credible 
constitution, which constitutes the wishes and 
aspirations of the people and all civil society’, and 
went on to recommend the establishment of a 
commission made up of experts on constitutional 
law to draft the Constitution, drawing on data 
collected throughout East Timor (CNRT 2000:27). 
In December 2000, however, the President of CNRT, 
Xanana Gusmao, presented an accelerated ‘Calendar 
for Political Transition’ to the National Council 
which envisaged the drafting of the Constitution 
by an elected Constituent Assembly. In the end, the 
countdown to independence may have been the 
paramount consideration for both the UN and the 
President of CNRT. For the former, the pressure was 
on to complete a costly mission as swiftly as possible; 
for the latter, political authority was slipping away 
with the passage of time and the emergence of 
Fretilin from out of the shadows of CNRT.
The choice of a Constituent Assembly effec-
tively narrowed the spectrum of people likely to 
be directly involved in determining the substance 
of the Constitution, excluding those without a 
political party power base and those wishing to  
engage in nation-building outside the party 
political process. In consultations initiated by the 
National Council on the approach, civil society 
pressed hard for public participation in the 
development of the Constitution and the National 
Council member representing non-government 
organisations brought forward a draft Regulation 
proposing the establishment of national and district 
constitutional commissions to consult the people at 
district and subdistrict level and to feed the results 
into the Constituent Assembly (UN Department of 
Public Information, 27 March 2001).
The proposal split the National Council and 
spotlighted once again the depth of animosity 
between Xanana Gusmao and Fretilin. Fretilin 
rejected the proposal as political manipulation, 
triggering an acrimonious debate with Gusmao, 
who supported the proposal.13 Immediately after, 
Gusmao resigned, claiming that the National 
Council no longer reflected the views of the 
Timorese people (BBC, 28 March 2001), and 
committed instead to dedicate himself to working 
with civil society (Radio Australia, 29 March 2001).
For the first and only time in the life of the 
mission, the UN Transitional Administrator formally 
overruled the National Council and unilaterally 
promulgated a directive (number 2001/3) 
establishing constitutional commissions in each of 
the 13 administrative districts of Timor to consult 
widely and submit reports of their consultations to 
the Constituent Assembly. In the event, the gesture 
proved hollow as the Fretilin-dominated Constituent 
Assembly ignored the reports, which were dismissed 
as lacking legitimacy (Baltazar 2004).
The Electoral Mechanism
Having opted for a Constituent Assembly to draft 
the Constitution, the mechanism adopted to 
elect the assembly further narrowed the basis of 
popular representation. The assembly comprised 
88 members: 75 were elected from a single national 
constituency using a closed list of candidates 
(i.e. voters cast their ballot for a party rather than 
for named candidates) with seats allocated in 
proportion to each party’s share of the total vote; 
the remaining 13 members were elected from 
single-member district constituencies (one for each 
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of the 13 districts) on a first-past-the-post basis. 
A consequence of this electoral system was that 
those elected largely owed their position — and 
their loyalty — to the party that placed them in a 
winnable slot on the party ticket, while they were 
not directly accountable to the voters (Ingram 
2003:88).
UNTAET was concerned to achieve a 
pluralist assembly and favoured a single national 
constituency over more localised constituencies and 
the use of proportional representation to achieve 
this end. The inclusion of the 13 district seats was 
a concession to proponents of local representation. 
The combination of the two voting mechanisms, 
however, had the effect of magnifying the Fretilin 
vote. Although Fretilin won only 57.3 per cent 
of the overall vote (and 43 out of 75 seats) in the 
national constituency, it won 12 of the 13 district 
seats14 giving it 55 of the 88 seats or 62.5 per cent 
overall — a 5.2 per cent advance on its proportional 
vote share, which yielded it a bonus five seats. In 
partnership with a minor like-minded party, Fretilin 
commanded the necessary 60-seat super majority 
required for the passage of the Constitution. The 
consequence was a majoritarian assembly that 
created no incentive for compromise.15
Constitutional Timetable
The whole process of constitution-making was 
done at breakneck speed: initially only 90 days were 
allowed from the first sitting day of the Constitu-
ent Assembly to the adoption of the Constitution, 
mirroring the UN timetable for the Cambodian 
Constitution several years before. This period was 
subsequently extended by a further three months, 
incorporating a further round of what proved to be 
little better than token consultation on a text that 
had the necessary numbers for passage.
The key political actors seemed comfortable with 
a rapid timetable. On the eve of 2001, in a speech to 
the Timorese people, Gusmao had stated that, 
if it is accepted that the Constitution should 
not be of a programmatic or ideological 
nature and that it should be simple and uni-
versal, the Constituent Assembly will not 
need a lengthy period of time to debate the 
first Constitution of Timor. It will only require 
enough time to fine tune the draft …
In fact, there were several drafts in the works. Fretilin, 
which was sitting on its own well-developed draft 
dating back to 1998, was also keen to move quickly.
The church, some of the minor political parties 
and Timorese civil society were deeply unhappy 
with the perfunctory process outlined. On 18 April 
2001, the NGO Forum wrote to the head of 
UNTAET’s Political Affairs Unit, criticising the 
rushed timetable and proposing that, without a 
significant extension, the Constitution that emerged 
should be regarded as an interim text only, allowing 
more time for broad-based input and consultation. 
They were guided, in part, by the South African 
experience where an interim constitution was put 
in place for three years while consultation and 
negotiation continued on a final text.
Beyond the substantive provisions of the Con-
stitution, a legacy of the rushed timetable is the 
technical quality of the drafting itself that could 
play into future challenges to the interpretation of 
constitutional powers.
Transformation of Constituent Assembly into the 
First Parliament
The provision for the Constituent Assembly to 
morph into parliament at independence was 
another deeply contested decision. The mechanism 
was foreshadowed in Regulation 2001/2 on the 
election of a Constituent Assembly, article 2.6 
of which stated that, ‘The Constituent Assembly 
shall become the legislature of an independent 
East Timor, if so provided in the Constitution’. Not 
surprisingly, the assembly embraced the proposal, 
and the Constitution did so provide. For UNTAET, 
the transformation of Constituent Assembly into 
parliament kept the foot on the accelerator, avoiding 
the additional step (and cost) of a further election. 
For the Constituent Assembly, the provision 
ensured their relevance beyond independence.
The provision was problematic on a number of 
fronts. For the members of the Constituent Assem-
bly, it created a serious conflict of interest in that 
it is difficult to be — or appear to be — objective 
about critical policy choices when they directly 
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affect your own interests and prospects. It was also 
problematic in a democratic sense, as the citizens 
of East Timor had elected a body to make a con-
stitution, and not a body to govern them into the 
future. There was strong concern that voters had 
been denied the opportunity to hear and vote on 
the policy platforms of the parties as a prospective 
government, and concern that this deficit under-
mined the legitimacy of the future government.
When the implications became apparent, high-
profile leaders including Xanana Gusmao and 
Bishop Belo and sections of civil society urged 
UNTAET to hold a further election to choose 
the parliament. UNTAET’s response was to leave 
the decision to the Constituent Assembly on the 
grounds that it was the legitimate representative 
body for the Timorese people.16 This response 
bordered on the disingenuous since the Constituent 
Assembly was itself directly interested in the 
outcome and its position was clear.
UNTAET’s Hands-off Approach on 
Constitutional Substance
UNTAET stood back from the deliberations 
governing the substantive provisions of the Const-
itution, on the grounds that the contents of the 
Constitution must reflect the sovereign act of an 
elected body:
… UNTAET went to considerable, perhaps 
extraordinary, lengths to ensure that there 
was little or no interference with the right of 
the East Timorese people, through the elected 
Constituent Assembly, to prepare whatever 
sort of constitution they wanted, and that right 
was exercised (Morrow and White 2002:43).
While the principle is sound, it can unravel in 
practice, and in March 2002 the UN High Com-
missioner for Human Rights reported that, in 
emphasising the ‘representative democratic’ model 
of government, the assembly seemed to be mini-
mising the right of individuals in East Timor to 
participate in political life by contributing to the 
political debate surrounding the substance of the 
Constitution; instead, the draft constitutional texts 
of the parties were the focus of drafting (Morrow 
and White 2002:41).
Of the five constitutional drafts brought for-
ward by political parties in the initial weeks of the 
Constituent Assembly, the Fretilin draft prevailed 
as the primary text (Garrison 2005:20) and the 
Constitution that passed was based on it. When the 
first draft of the Constitution was put to the vote, 
16 assembly members voted against it, and when 
the final draft was put to the vote after a last round 
of perfunctory consultation, the outcome was simi-
lar. The parties voting against the text explained 
their concerns that the Constitution was a Fretilin 
document with only minor adjustments to the orig-
inal draft (Carter Center 2004:41).
Substantive Constitutional Provisions
To the extent that constitutions encapsulate many 
of the formal elements of the political settlement at 
the time they are made, and political settlements are 
about the distribution of power within a political 
system, it is instructive to look at how Timor’s Con-
stitution distributes executive power. Two aspects in 
particular are significant:
• the centres of executive power
• the Executive’s law-making powers.
Centres of Executive Power
CNRT anticipated a presidential system of govern-
ment, with the powers of the president defined in 
the Constitution (CNRT 2000:27). In the wider 
popular imagination, Xanana Gusmao as the 
leader of the resistance struggle and President of 
CNRT was the ordained leader of the nation and 
the expectation was that, as president, he would 
embody the government. This was a natural 
assumption for a people who had lived under the 
Indonesian political system where power was con-
centrated in the president.
Throughout the UNTAET period, Fretilin lead-
ers publicly talked up Xanana Gusmao as president. 
At the same time, the comprehensive constitutional 
draft that they had developed in 1998, and which 
they were positioning to become the master text for 
the Constituent Assembly’s deliberations, provided 
for a semi-presidential system that concentrated 
power to initiate and execute policy in the prime 
minister, leaving the office of president with residu-
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al powers to restrain specific expressions of execu-
tive and legislative power.
A sense of ambush prevailed across wide 
sections of the political elite as the implications 
of the Fretilin constitutional draft sank in. It 
was widely seen as a deliberate and devious 
emasculation of the office of president in order to 
eclipse the political power of Xanana Gusmao. A 
commentary on the Constituent Assembly’s draft 
text by the Australian section of the International 
Commission of Jurists opens:
Although all but one of the submissions 
received by the committees of the East Timor 
Constituent Assembly propose a Presidential 
style of Constitution, and all major political 
parties proposed that there would be a presi-
dential system and made it clear that Xanana 
Gusmao would be that President, the draft 
Constitution fails to set up such a system 
other than in title only. The power is vested 
in the Government as under a UK Westmin-
ster style parliamentary system … making 
the office of President effectively totally sub-
ordinate to the Prime Minister (International 
Commission of Jurists 2002:1).
In a press conference only weeks before the 
scheduled presidential election in April 2002, 
Xanana Gusmao signalled a reluctance to stand 
as ‘the only powers accorded the president under 
the draft constitution were the powers “to eat and 
sleep’’ ’ (Aucoin and Brandt 2010:270).
In the lusophone tradition, Timor’s 
Constitution is unremarkable: it follows the semi-
presidential model adopted by Portugal in 1976 
after its military-led revolution, and by all the new  
states emerging over the same period from 
Portugal’s former African colonies (Neto and 
Lobo 2009:1).17 In 1982 Portugal amended its 
Constitution in the transition to a fully civilian 
government to reduce the powers of the president. 
The resulting Constitution has been characterised 
by some academics as constituting a parliamentary 
system, although a better characterisation is as a 
premier–presidential regime, a subclass of semi-
presidential systems (Neto and Lobo 2010). Under 
premier–presidential systems, executive power is 
concentrated in the office of prime minister, but 
significant legislative and non-legislative powers 
are vested in the president. These powers include 
veto over parliamentary Bills and executive-made 
regulations, appointment of the prime minister, 
dissolution of parliament, and dismissal of the 
government and removal of the prime minister.
As significant as the fact of a semi-presidential 
system is the extent of the specific powers assigned 
to the president in Timor-Leste. In this, a compari-
son of the Portuguese and Timorese constitutions 
is revealing. While the Timorese Constitution has 
many of the features of the Portuguese, it narrows 
the powers of the president in subtle ways. For 
example:
• broad discretions in the Portuguese 
Constitution, such as the power to dissolve 
the parliament, are narrowed in the Timorese 
Constitution by the specification of very precise 
circumstances that may trigger the exercise of 
the power
• discretionary powers in the Portuguese Consti-
tution become mandatory exercises of power in 
the Timorese Constitution; e.g. the presidential 
power to call a referendum18
• stricter criteria are imposed in the Timorese 
Constitution for the exercise of a discretion; 
e.g. in the appointment of the prime minister
• certain powers are contracted or omitted in the 
Timorese Constitution; e.g. the scope of matters 
that may be referred to the constitutional court 
for a ruling, or the provision for the president to 
Chair the Council of Ministers when requested 
by the prime minister (absent from the Timor-
ese Constitution).
With Xanana Gusmao elected president and 
his bitter political opponent from Fretilin, Mari 
Alkitiri, appointed prime minister, the ‘dual leader-
ship system’ of the Constitution had the effect of 
creating two rival power centres, with the potential 
to destabilise the state (Shoesmith 2003:232). While 
the prime minister had the power to lead on policy, 
the president held enormous moral authority with 
the people and was handed a powerful constitution-
al tool to frustrate the Executive through the exer-
cise of the presidential veto over legislation. These 
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conditions set the scene for a fierce political contest 
over the following years.
Executive Law-Making
The Timorese Constitution extends wide law-
making power to the Executive, a provision that 
attracted adverse comment during the drafting 
stage from the International Commission of Jurists:
The draft Constitution provides for dele-
gation on a whole range of issues of the 
legislative function to the Government 
itself. This means that there will not be 
parliamentary scrutiny of Government 
action and legislation. Such a provision is 
quite out of step with modern Constitutions, 
particularly in a newly established country 
(International Commission of Jurists 2002:3).
Again, the provision for Executive law-making 
is consistent with the scheme in the Portuguese 
Constitution, which confers wide legislative power 
on the government along with a presidential power 
to veto executive legislation and a provision for 
the assembly to consider, amend and disallow 
legislation made by the Executive when it is exer-
cising delegated powers. The more interesting 
consideration is the extent to which the Timorese 
Constitution amplifies the Portuguese scheme in 
favour of the Executive.
A notable area of difference is the breadth 
of matters on which the Executive may legislate. 
Both constitutions describe matters on which 
the parliament may delegate legislative authority, 
and matters for which the Executive has exclusive 
legislative power. In the Timorese Constitution, 
while the list of matters on which the parliament 
may delegate legislative power is shorter, the scope 
of various heads of power is rather more ample. Nor 
are the parliamentary checks as robustly stated: the 
Portuguese Constitution expressly stipulates that 
parliament is responsible for considering Executive 
legislation, and that Executive legislation must 
reference the legislation that authorises its making; 
the Timorese Constitution is silent on both.
A major difference between the two 
constitutions is in the scope of matters on which 
the Executive has exclusive legislative power. In the 
Portuguese Constitution, this is limited to matters 
respecting the government’s own organisation and 
functioning (art. 198(2)). This provision is repeated 
in the Timorese Constitution, but a further power 
is added, namely, to legislate exclusively on direct 
and indirect administration of the State (art. 115(3)). 
This head of power could be interpreted extremely 
broadly. As neither constitution empowers the 
parliament to scrutinise legislation made by the 
Executive in the exercise of its exclusive legislative 
power, this leaves the president as the first and last 
port of call where legislation is controversial, and 
his only power is that of veto. This arrangement has 
the potential to magnify hostility in a situation of 
cohabitation between a politically opposed president 
and prime minister: the precise situation that 
prevailed at Timor’s independence.
Conclusions
UNTAET was mobilised to deal with the aftermath 
of the violent separation of the territory of Timor 
from Indonesia, and the consolidation of the political 
settlement with Indonesia and its militia supporters 
was centre stage. In essence, however, the transition 
in Timor involved two distinct political settlements: 
as well as building a constructive bilateral relation-
ship with Indonesia that included provision for 
— and supervision of — those people who had 
left Timor and would not return, a new settlement 
needed to be forged within Timor among those 
who had struggled for independence to frame the 
distribution and exercise of power in the new state.
The internal settlement was largely under 
UNTAET’s radar. There had been a strong elite 
convergence in the late 1990s, embodied in the 
formation of the Concelho Nacional de Resistencia 
Timorense in 1998, and CNRT had provided an easy 
reference point for the international community 
in the lead-up to the independence vote in August 
1999. Yet this apparent unity masked deep divi-
sions within: consensus on the goal of independence 
did not equate with consensus on how — and by 
whom — Timor should be governed. Within a year 
of UNTAET’s deployment, the elite convergence had 
disintegrated, paving the way for conflicted politics. 
It is an open question whether the internal political 
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settlement that subsequently took shape would have 
been less divisive had UNTAET taken different 
decisions about how it engaged with elite and com-
munity interests, or whether it would simply have 
given the edge to different players without altering 
an inevitable outcome.
That UNTAET’s decisions would affect the  
distribution of power in subtle ways was unavoid-
able. The judgement on the mission rests more 
on the extent to which it was alert to the potential 
consequences and framed its decisions with this in 
mind. Here, the report card is mixed. Its actions 
suggest that it mistook the absence of government 
as a political vacuum and, while it consulted 
narrowly, it largely drove the state-building agenda 
according to its own imperatives. In UNTAET’s 
defence, when it was deployed state-building was 
seen more in terms of building the machinery of  
state than in terms of supporting an inclusive 
political settlement and state institutions that 
worked in the interests of the wider society: these 
insights entered the development discourse several 
years later.
UNTAET was under pressure from both the 
Timorese leadership and the Security Council to 
complete its mission quickly. In the stampede to 
build the core structures for an independent state 
and to finalise the Constitution so that a political 
transition could be effected, UNTAET ticked off 
on the expected outputs that had been laid out for 
it, but these did not translate into a stable platform 
for the state. A stable state would require rather 
more than the sum of the parts the mission was 
assembling.
The state-building process in Timor under 
UNTAET created clear winners and losers, and dis-
affected losers are a potential threat to stability as 
they work on the institutional margins to effect a 
realignment of power. This played out in the esca-
lating tensions in East Timor through the UNTAET 
period and into the early years of independence. 
Although UNTAET consolidated the relationship 
with Indonesia and built the organisational frame-
work for the independent state of Timor-Leste, it  
failed to nurture an inclusive internal political set-
tlement as the essential foundation for a stable state.
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Endnotes
1 The territory was referred to by the UN as East Timor 
throughout the period of Indonesian occupation 
and the transitional period to independence; upon 
independence the state adopted the name Timor-
Leste. I follow this usage in this paper, using the 
name Timor-Leste for events from the date of 
independence.
2 The actual question put to voters in the plebiscite 
(referred to as a ‘popular consultation’) was whether 
they supported or rejected ‘special autonomy’ for 
the province of East Timor within the Republic of 
Indonesia. This was a face-saving formulation for 
the Government of Indonesia. The understanding 
underpinning the popular consultation — and 
announced by Indonesia’s President Habibe in early 
1999 — was that a vote against autonomy would be 
regarded as a vote for independence.
3 The main achievements of the mission are outlined 
in a fact sheet of April 2002 from the UNTAET Press 
office, UNTAET’s 25 Major Achievements, available at 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/
etimor/fact/fs01.PDF>.
4 From January 2000, UNTAET issued daily press 
briefings. A content analysis of the topics covered in 
the six months to 30 June 2000 shows that around 
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one-third of topics (34.4 per cent) related to border, 
refugee and militia matters and other bilateral issues 
with Indonesia. Mission management topics came in 
second at 21.9 per cent.
5 For a detailed account of the schisms, see 
International Crisis Group (2006).
6 In the mid-1990s there was a change of personnel 
working on the Timor question at UN headquarters 
and efforts were made to engage East Timorese 
leaders outside the tripartite process (CAVR 2005: 
122–23, 129).
7 This strategic plan was known as the ‘Transitional 
Results Matrix’. It covered ten domains (political 
affairs, administrative handover, defence force, 
foreign affairs, law and order, public finances, 
agriculture/economy, health, education and 
infrastructure) and outlined a series of outputs to 
be progressively achieved over successive quarters 
within each domain. The mission reported quarterly 
to donors against the matrix, with major reports 
provided every six months in advance of the six-
monthly donors’ conferences.
8 The Department of Political Affairs, which had been 
the area within the UN Secretariat dealing with Timor 
in the lead-up to the political transition, had a deep 
understanding of the local context; the Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in contrast, was 
new to Timor and had no accumulated contextual 
expertise. In framing the mission mandate, DPKO took 
Kosovo — a vastly different context — as its model and 
this along with the prevailing DPKO culture regarding 
engagement with parties to a conflict led to it treat 
CNRT as a faction rather than as the umbrella body for 
the independence struggle (Suhrke 2001:6–8).
9 ‘CNRT must exist because it represents the 
aspirations of the People and because it is the 
interlocutor between the Transitional Administration 
via the National Council.’ (CNRT 2000:14).
10 ‘But we cannot run a modern state with a basic 
language so our strategic choice now is to reintroduce 
Portuguese as our official language.’ (Ramos Horta 
1999a:123).
11 As early as January 2000, the Tetun-language media 
had decried the language decision as that of a tiny 
minority trying to impose their will on a majority 
(Lalenok editorial, 18 January 2000).
12 The UN General Assembly report notes that ‘a 
recent study by the United Nations Environment 
Programme concluded that 40 per cent of internal 
conflicts over a 60-year period were associated with 
land and natural resources, and that this link doubles 
the risk of conflict relapse in the first five years’.
13 The hostility with which the proposal was received by 
the Fretilin members of the National Council belied 
the fact that only days before the council had passed 
Regulation 2001/2 on the election of a Constituent 
Assembly which specified in article 2.4 that, ‘In its 
deliberations, the Constituent Assembly should give 
due consideration to the results of the consultations 
conducted by any duly constituted Constitutional 
Commission or Commissions’.
14 Fretilin would probably have won all 13 seats had 
its candidate in Oecussi not missed the deadline for 
registration.
15 Smaller parties in the Constituent Assembly 
complained that Fretilin ‘unilaterally imposed its will’ 
while open voting and tight party discipline ensured 
Fretilin members followed the party line rather than 
their own conscience (Babo Soares 2003:29).
16 This position was presented by Colin Stewart, of 
UNTAET’s Political Affairs Unit, at a public policy 
seminar on ‘The Transformation of Constituent 
Assembly into Legislative Assembly: Do we Need a 
New Election’ held in Dili in December 2001.
17 Semi-presidential systems are reportedly now the 
most prevalent regime type found in Europe (Roper 
citing Strom and Neto 2002:254).
18 Article 115(1) of the Portuguese Constitution reads, 
‘Os cidadãos eleitores recenseados no território 
nacional podem ser chamados a pronunciar-se 
directamente, a título vinculativo, através de 
referendo, por decisão do Presidente da República, 
mediante proposta da Assembleia da República ou do 
Governo …’ Article 66(2) of the Timorese Constitution, 
in comparison, uses the language, ‘O referendo 
e convocado pelo Presidente da Republica, por 
proposta de um terco e deliberacao aprovada por uma 
maioria de dois tercos dos Deputados ou por proposta 
fundamentada do Governo’ (emphasis added).
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